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Abstract 
The crisis has affected all European economies, but it has also brought into relief the sub-
stantial differentiation across the region. We demonstrate that it has put an increased 
premium on sound macroeconomic and macroprudential policies: economies with lower 
inflation, smaller current account deficits, and lower dependence on bank-related capi-
tal inflows have fared significantly better. We also show that the crisis has led to the dis-
appearance of the so-called “halo effect”, which was the observation in the pre-crisis 
period that spreads on sovereign bonds in the new European Union member countries 
were lower than could be explained by fundamentals.  
1. Introduction 
What determined the impact of the global financial crisis on the emerging 
markets in Europe? An analysis of cross-country differences in sovereign bond spreads 
during the crisis suggests that the soundness of pre-crisis macroeconomic policies, 
as reflected particularly in inflation and current account deficits, is very important 
in explaining the severity of the impact. This is true for the emerging European 
economies that remain outside the European Union (EU) as well as those that be-
came EU members (the so-called “New Member States”); for the latter group, ad-
herence to EU rules and institutions has helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis, 
but it has not shielded them completely.  
Analyzing spreads on New Member State (NMS) sovereign bonds in early 
2000s, one could find that while a fundamental (economic) analysis pointed to ris-
ing vulnerabilities in some of the NMS economies, markets remained optimistic, 
compressing sovereign bond yields. This difference between the fundamentals and 
the actual sovereign bond rates has been dubbed the “halo effect”. The increase 
in the NMS sovereign bond spreads in the years 2007–08 can be viewed in part 
as a dissipation of the so-called “halo effect.” The analysis in this article suggests 
that the “halo effect” was essentially an unexplained residual that has turned out to 
be temporary. 
The remainder of the article has the following structure. Section 2 reviews 
the stylized facts of the impact of the crisis. Section 3 presents the analysis of the EU 
halo effect. Section 4 focuses on the role of domestic policies and external vulner-
abilities. Section 5 concludes.  
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or IMF policy. The authors thank L. Everaert and H. Berger for 
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Some of the material presented in 
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Table 1  Snapshot of Emerging Europe 
Intensity of the 
Crisis  
Aug 07–Nov 08
Macroeconomic Indicators  EU Convergence Criteria 
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Emerging Europe  -61.4  612  9.7  -11.4  -0.2  26.8  4.9  …  … 
Emerging Europe 
countries receiving 
IMF support  
-59.4 788 12.9  -11.1 -1.8 25.2  6.9  …  … 
EU New Member 
States 
f  -58.3 359 12.1  -10.4 -0.8 26.3  4.5  …  … 
Non-EU emerging 
Europe  -64.4 865  7.4  -12.2  0.2 27.2  5.2  …  … 
Flexible exchange 
rate emerging  -57.6 394  7.0  -6.9  -2.6 39.8  2.7  …  … 
Nonflexible exchange 
rate emerging   -61.8  485  12.9  -9.4 0.9  16.3 6.3  …  … 
Euro  area  -51.2  60    -0.7 -0.7  65.8 -0.4  …  … 
Non-euro area 
advanced  -51.5 121 11.4  6.9  5.1 44.5  -0.7  …  … 
Non-European emerg-
ing (except China)  …  … 1.4  … -1.3  … …  … … 
Memorandum items              
Emerging Europe 
g -61.4  612  9.7  -11.4  -0.2  26.8 4.9  …  … 
Albania …  …  1.4  -13.5  -3.8  52.7  -0.9  …  … 
Belarus  … …  5.9 -8.4  0.4  11.5  … …  … 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  … …  5.1  -15.0  -0.1  29.8  …  …  … 
Bulgaria -76.9  355  14.2  -24.4  3.5  19.8  8.0  No  Yes 
Croatia -68.1  404  6.9  -9.4  -1.2  33.2  2.0  …  … 
Czech Republic  -51.8  125  4.7  -3.1  -1.0  28.9  2.2  No  Yes 
Estonia  -71.9 …  19.0  -9.2 3.0 3.5 6.2 Yes  Yes 
Hungary  -56.6  431 10.7 -7.8 -4.9  65.9  1.9  No  No 
Latvia -56.1  326  25.8  -13.2  0.7  7.8  11.3  Yes  No 
Lithuania -66.6  488  12.5  -11.6  -1.2  17.0  6.8  Yes  No 
Macedonia …  …  …  -13.1  0.6  23.4  3.0  …  … 
Moldova …  …  7.7  -19.4  -0.2  27.7  8.7  …  … 
Montenegro …  …  …  -31.3  6.2  27.5  …  …  … 
Poland -57.4  199  8.0  -5.5  -2.0  44.9  0.1  No  Yes 
Romania -70.8  823  7.7  -12.6  -3.1  19.8  3.6  No  No 
Russia  -64.7  662  7.4 6.1 6.8 7.3 9.3  … No 
Serbia  … …  16.0 -17.3  -1.9 33.7  8.8  … … 
Slovak Republic  -16.8  127  6.2  -6.3  -1.9  29.3  0.4  Yes  Yes 
Turkey -51.3  392  4.1  -5.7  -2.1  39.4  5.8  …  No 
Ukraine -73.5  2003  11.5  -7.2  -2.0  12.8  … …  NoFinance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                     543 
Sources: Bloomberg L.P.; IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; European Cen-
tral Bank; European Commission; and IMF staff calculations. 
Notes: 
a Balance of payments, Financial Account: Other investment, net liabilities. The data is the sum of "Cur-
rencies and Deposits", which includes all foreign parent bank loans to subsidiaries, and "Loans", 
which includes crossborder loans to banks and nonbank corporates. 
b IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
c Deviation from 4.17 percent--1.5+average inflation in the three lowest inflation EU members. Thus 
the inflation benchmark is based on recent data for 2008, rather than the EC and the ECB's bench-
mark for the 2008 reports, 3.2 percent. 
d Based on DG ECFIN's May 2008 and ECB's May 2008 convergence reports.  
e Based on DG ECFIN's May 2008 and ECB's May 2008 convergence reports. The benchmark was 
6.5 percent in 2008. 
f  New Member States or countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and had not joined the euro 
area as of end-2008. In the subsequent analyses, some countries are excluded owing to lack of data; 
Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia are included in one analysis. 
g Definition of Emerging Europe as of end-2008; in early 2009, the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic were reclassified as advanced economies for the purposes of the World Economic Outlook. 
Bold indicates countries that have received IMF financial support as of March 20, 2009. 
 
2. Who Got Hurt More? Stylized Facts 
Developments in emerging European economies in the run-up to and during 
the global financial crisis had several common characteristics. In most of these econ-
omies, large declines in stock prices and increases in sovereign bond spreads during 
the crisis were associated with large external and internal imbalances and bank-re-
lated capital inflows prior to the crisis (Table 1).
1 Many of the emerging markets had 
large current account deficits, financed largely by borrowing of subsidiaries of for-
eign banks from their parents. The banks used the relatively cheap foreign funding to 
extend credit to households and nonfinancial firms. This resulted in rapid growth of 
domestic credit, denominated mostly in foreign currency in almost all the countries. 
Credit went largely into financing nontradables and imports of consumer durables, 
spilling into current account deficits, and, in most cases, into inflation.  
Despite these remarkable common characteristics, cross-country variation among 
the emerging European economies remained substantial, in particular in the response 
of stock prices and bond spreads in the crisis countries (Table 1).  
Three stylized facts emerge from this analysis: 
 – Differentiation in sovereign spreads. Non-EU emerging European economies have 
been among the worst hit. The new EU member states (emerging economies that 
joined the EU in 2004 and thereafter; NMS), which had smaller spreads to begin 
with, have suffered the least (Figure 1). Bond spreads in some emerging economies 
have widened several times more than in the  euro area. With the  exception of 
Hungary, the reason has not been primarily fiscal: the spreads have in most cases 
widened despite relatively healthy fiscal balances and low government debt.
2 
The widening has rather reflected market participants’ concerns about the govern-
ments’ contingent liabilities in case of major banking and other corporate defaults.  
1 For the purpose of this article, Emerging European economies are defined to include (1) countries that
joined the EU in 2004 or thereafter and had not joined the euro area by end-2008 (Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic), and (2) the non-EU
countries of Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. In the subsequent econometric analyses, some countries were dropped due to
lack of data. (It should be noted that in early 2009, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were re-
classified as advanced economies for the purposes of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.) 544                                     Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Figure 1  Sovereign Bond Spreads, 2005–08 
                                 
Note: Spreads in euros for New Member States and non-EU emerging Europe; in U.S. dollars for all others. 
Sources: Bloomberg L.P.; and IMF staff calculations. 
 
 – Strong role for bank-related capital inflows. The ratio of bank-related capital in-
flows to gross domestic product (GDP) in emerging European economies has 
been a multiple of the ratios for emerging non-European economies (Table 1).
3 In 
general, emerging European economies have strong banking linkages to advanced 
economies – for instance, emerging Europe’s stock of bank liabilities to advanced 
countries exceeded 50% of its GDP, about three times the ratio for other emerg-
ing markets. But even within emerging Europe, the size of these cross-border 
banking flows has varied. At about 13% of GDP in the run-up to the crisis, bank- 
-related capital inflows were especially strong in the  countries that eventually 
received multilateral financial support.  
 – Macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Indicators of overheating, such as large current ac-
count deficits, fast credit growth, and accelerating inflation, were flashing red in 
these countries subsequently most affected by the  crisis. The  massive capital 
inflows helped to finance high current account deficits, averaging about 11% of 
GDP in emerging European economies in 2008. Moreover, countries with higher 
bank credit growth to the private sector seem to have been worse hit (Figure 2). 
The same holds true for emerging markets with inflexible exchange rate regimes 
(Table 1). 
3. Regional Factors: EU Halo Effect 
What factors explain the differentiated sovereign bond spreads? Specifically, 
to what extent do the changes in spreads reflect investors’ views on emerging econo- 
2 In fact, the average ratio of government debt to GDP in countries that had to resort to official financial
assistance has been less than half of the euro area average. 
3 Bank-related capital inflows are defined as the balance of payments item “other investment, liabilities,”
aggregating the sub-items “loans” and “currency and deposits.” These two items capture loans comprising in-
flows from parent banks into emerging market subsidiaries and cross-border loans to banks and nonbank 
corporates, excluding portfolio and foreign direct investment inflows. The breakdown of this category into 
bank and nonbank flows is not available consistently across countries, but available data and anecdotal
evidence suggest that the bank-related portion is large, reflecting the central roles of the banking sector and 
the high degree of foreign ownership in most emerging European banking systems.  Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                     545 
Figure 2  European Emerging Economies: Crisis Impact and Other Variables 
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Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg 
L.P.; and authors’ calculations. 
 
mies’ prospects for meeting the convergence criteria and adopting the euro?
4 And to 
what extent do the spreads reflect macroeconomic vulnerabilities in each country?  
Several papers have analyzed spreads on NMS sovereign bonds in the pre- 
-crisis period. Those papers found that, while a  fundamental (economic) analysis 
pointed to rising vulnerabilities in some of the NMS economies, markets remained 
optimistic, compressing sovereign bond yields to below levels seen in other emerg-
ing economies. This discrepancy was dubbed “the halo effect.” Hauner, Jonas, and 
Kumar (2007) and Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007) find the halo effect for 
2001–06 and 1995–2005 data, respectively.  
The interpretations of the halo effect in the literature differ. Hauner, Jonas, 
and Kumar (2007) posit that the EU halo effect is linked to the EU membership. 
Better institutions and processes, such as fiscal rules, that have been put in place 
4 The European Central Bank and the European Commission provide assessments for the NMS on their prog-
ress toward meeting the criteria for convergence to euro adoption (the “convergence criteria”). The five cri-
teria are the fiscal deficit (less than 3% of GDP), government debt (less than 60% of GDP), inflation (less 
than 3.2% for 2008), the long-term interest rate (less than 6.5% for 2008), and the exchange rate (partici-
pation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II).546                                     Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
since EU accession may also have had the effect of reducing sovereign risk (thus 
bringing countries closer to meeting the Maastricht criterion on government bond 
rates). This would suggest that the “halo effect” may be lasting. Luengnaruemitchai 
and Schadler (2007) argue that the “halo effect” is essentially an unexplained resid-
ual that may turn out to be temporary. 
To examine what the increased sovereign bond spreads during the crisis meant 
for the halo effect, we have used an econometric analysis to identify the role of fun-
damentals and global liquidity conditions in determining the  level of spreads on 
foreign currency denominated bonds – sovereign spreads – issued by emerging mar-
ket countries.
5  
We have employed a methodology similar to Eichengreen and Mody (1998), 
Hauner, Jonas, and Kumar (2007), and Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007). Fol-
lowing this methodology, we use three indices of fundamentals that group variables 
influencing economic risks, financial risks and political risks. This avoids the prob-
lem of multicollinearity among explanatory variables since several influences affect 
each risk category and in many instances they move in similar ways. Three other 
measures of global interest rates and liquidity conditions are also included. IMF (2006) 
suggests that this estimation model does a  good job in predicting the  spreads on 
a global level.  
To approximate the  price of “risk” of the  emerging markets in the  sample, 
JP Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index-Global (EMBIG) sovereign spreads is 
used as the dependent variable. The spreads of each country are weighted averages of 
yield spreads over US treasury bills of external debt instruments issued by sovereign 
and quasi sovereign entities (denominated in US$). For countries where (US$) EMBIG 
spreads are not available, Euro EMBIG spreads are used. These are yield spreads 
over German reference rates of external debt instruments denominated in Euro. 
The sample encompasses the 25 emerging market countries included in both MSCI 
Emerging Markets index and JP Morgan EMBIG index, and spans 1998 to 2008 for 
most of the countries.  
One caveat in this exercise is that it focuses on market perceptions about gov-
ernment or quasi-government default risks, which do not necessarily reflect overall 
risks to the economy including the private sector. This is an unavoidable shortcom-
ing insofar as sovereign bond spreads are the principal asset class comparable across 
countries. Other asset classes – domestic currency bonds, stock markets and ex-
change markets – are influenced by a variety of factors not directly related to the risk 
profile of issuing countries. 
Each of the  three indices of fundamentals that is included as explanatory 
variables – political, financial and economic – are composites of ratings of sever- 
al variables from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
6 In addition, following 
IMF (2006) and Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007), the present study includes 
three measures of global liquidity conditions: (1) Volatility Index (VIX), which is 
the volatility of U.S. stock market volatility implied in the pricing of S&P500 op-
tions; (2) implied yield of 3-month ahead 30-day Fed Funds futures, which reflects 
5 An earlier version of some of this work appeared in ýihák and Fonteyne (2009). 
6 The Guide is available from http://www.prsgroup.com. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                     547 
short term global interest rates as well as market expectations of future U.S. mone-
tary policy; and (3)  90-day rolling standard deviation of the  difference between 
implied yields on 3-month ahead Fed Funds futures and the Fed policy target rates. 
The volatility measure indicates the uncertainty about U.S. monetary policy, which 
has a large impact on global financial markets. These variables are from Bloomberg 
and are available daily. Since the ICRG ratings are updated on a monthly basis, all 
of the variables are averaged to a monthly frequency (this also filters out some of 
the noise in the day-to-day volatility of high-frequency variables). 
For comparability, the econometric approach in this study follows broadly 
the previous research, in particular IMF (2006) and Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler 
(2007). In line with those papers, the present study includes the measures of funda-
mentals and liquidity conditions in the  same estimating equation, using a  pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with country fixed effects. Specifically, the following 
equation is estimated: 
      
it i t t t
it it it it
u FFvol FF VIX
political financial econ spread
H E E E
E E E D
    
     
6 5 4
3 2 1 ) ln(
                  (1) 
where econit, financialit and politicalit are the values of ICRG’s economic, financial 
and political risk ratings of country i at time t, respectively. For all these variables, 
higher values mean better fundamentals, so the respective slope coefficients are ex-
pected to be negative . VIXt is the implied volatility index, FFt is the implied yield on 
the 3-month ahead 30-day Fed Funds futures, and FFvolt is the 90-day rolling stand-
ard deviation of the difference between implied yields on 3-month ahead Fed Funds 
futures and the Fed policy target rates. These three variables are likely to have a posi-
tive impact on the spreads. ui denotes individual country-specific fixed effects, and İit 
is the residual term. 
The estimation results (Table 2) are encouraging in that the underlying speci-
fication is robust and consistent with previous estimates in the literature. The vari-
ables enter with expected signs, and their coefficients are significant at 1% level of 
significance. As expected, better fundamentals (lower economic, financial and polit-
ical risks) are associated with lower sovereign spreads. Higher global interest rates 
and higher volatility in the financial markets lead to higher spreads. Similarly, spreads 
are higher when the volatility of interest rates implied by Fed Fund Futures rises.  
The residuals of the fixed effects regression (Figure 3) suggest that after con-
trolling for global liquidity conditions and fundamentals, the level of spreads of 
the NMS, which has been low and stable by emerging markets standards up to 2006, 
has returned to the “fundamental” levels (and even slightly above) in 2007–08. In 
other words, the NMS-wide halo effect seems to have disappeared during the global 
financial crisis. The charts are similar when one examines the residuals plus country 
fixed effects for individual NMS countries, even though there is considerable cross- 
-country differentiation within the  NMS. The  differentiation among the  NMS has 
increased in the crisis period, with the Baltic countries showing substantially higher 
spreads (differentiation has also occurred among the OMS, even though not to the same 
extent as among the NMS). 
In sum, the NMS-wide halo effect seems to have disappeared during the glob-
al financial crisis. At the same, it still holds that those NMS that adhere more closely 548                                     Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
Table 2  EU Halo Effect: Explaining Spreads on Sovereign Bonds 
  Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Random 
Effects  Fixed Effects 
Economic  Risk  -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
  (5.91)** (9.58)** (9.86)** 
Financial  Risk  -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 
  (25.70)** (13.80)** (13.81)** 
Political  Risk  -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 
  (30.25)** (6.54)** (4.82)** 
VIX  Index  0.06 0.05 0.05 
  (23.58)** (30.25)** (33.25)** 
Fed Fund Futures  0.04  0.02  0.02 
  (4.95)** (4.52)** (4.89)** 
Vol of Fed Fund Futures  0.96  1.56  1.58 
  (3.12)** (7.91)** (7.86)** 
Constant  10.94 8.72 8.69 
    (54.23)** (43.53)** (47.57)** 
Observations  3,171 3,171 3,171 
Number of Countries  25  25  25 
R
2-overall  0.60 0.51 0.49 
R
2-within 0.61  0.60   
R
2-between 0.61  0.58   
LM Test for Random Effects    21,548   
Hausmann Test      20.51 
Prob > Chi
2   0.00  0.00 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parenthesis. 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
Figure 3  Residuals from the Fixed Effect Regression for Sovereign Spreads 
January 2001–October 2008 
                          
Sources: Bloomberg; IMF, International Financial Statistics; national authorities; and IMF staff estimates. Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6                                     549 
to the Maastricht criteria tend to have lower spreads and face less strong market pres-
sures. This is consistent with the findings of Debrun and Joshi (2008), who, using 
data for 1990–2005, do not find an EU-wide “halo effect,” but find that countries ad-
hering more closely to EU’s fiscal rules tended to have lower bond spreads (which is 
likely to be a fiscal soundness effect rather than an EU effect). 
4. Domestic Policies and External Vulnerabilities 
Among the NMS, an important measure of countries’ macroeconomic stabili-
ty has been the degree of compliance with the convergence criteria for euro adoption. 
The individual states have differed substantially in their ability to meet the conver-
gence criteria. Slovenia and the Slovak Republic have already entered the euro area. 
The other EU emerging economies have been able to satisfy some of the criteria, but 
have had difficulties meeting all them at the same time.  
Against this background, can a country’s performance relative to the conver-
gence criteria explain movements in bond spreads during the crisis?
  The answer is 
a qualified “yes,” based on an analysis of cross-country differences in bond spreads 
in European countries during three recent episodes of increased financial market 
stress: (1) the mini-crisis period from January 2006 to September 2006 (marked by 
a negative ratings report on Iceland, and revelations about worse-than-expected fiscal 
outcomes in Hungary); (2) the first phase of the financial crisis, from August 2007 to 
August 2008 (before the fall of Lehman Brothers); and (3) a more recent phase, after 
September 2008 (Table 3). The econometric analysis involves robust ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates on pooled data of 43 European countries, covering three main 
subgroups: euro area members, NMS, and other emerging Europe. Episode fixed 
effects were used to control for common factors that affected all countries. Country- 
-specific variables were used to explain cross-country differences in performance. 
The spreads are influenced by global factors to a large extent (the episode 
fixed effects are strong) but beyond these, country-specific differentiation took place. 
The main findings of the empirical analyses suggest the following: 
First, the immediate impact of the crisis was clearly differentiated among coun-
try groups. The NMS were hit significantly harder than the old EU countries.
 7 And 
the widening of bond spreads in emerging non-EU European countries was on 
average almost double the increase of that in the NMS. In contrast, there was some 
latitude towards the euro area countries. 
Second, inflation performance matters. Countries that had greater conver-
gence with the convergence criteria saw smaller increases in bond spreads and smaller 
drops in stock prices during the crisis.
 A more detailed analysis suggests that this 
overall result was driven by inflation performance, which seems to matter more in 
explaining cross-country differences in the crisis impact on spreads, as well as in 
explaining the evolution of bond spreads than the  other items on the  convergence 
criteria checklist.  
Third, financial markets reacted adversely to external vulnerability indica-
tors, over and above their reaction to the convergence criteria. 
7 Each convergence criterion is assigned one point. If the country meets a criterion, it gets 0; otherwise, 1. 
Therefore, the variable used in the regression takes values from 0 (for a country fulfilling all criteria) to 5 
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Table 3  Did the Convergence Criteria Matter? 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Impact--Log of Change in Bond Spreads
a
    Convergence criteria (CC) and note”b” 
  
Regional 
differences Only 
the CC 
Actual 
perfor-
mance 
Current 
account 
balance 
Capital 
inflow 
Capital 
inflow and  
credit  
growth 
(1)  Euro  area  -0.04       
    (0.09)       
(2)  New Member States (NMS)  0.19           
    (0.10)+       
(3)  Other emerging European 
countries  0.39       
    (0.15)*       
(4)  Nonfulfillment of the CC  
(index 0–6)
 b    0.11 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 
         (0.03)** (0.03)     (0.03)**    (0.03)**    (0.02)** 
(5)  Nonfulfillment of the CC*euro 
area dummy     -0.04     
       (0.03)       
(6)  Nonfulfillment of the CC*NMS 
dummy     -0.02     
       (0.02)       
(7) Inflation  rate      0.05       
          (0.02)*       
(8)  Real GDP growth in previous 
year     0.01     
       (0.01)       
(9)  Fiscal deficit in previous year      -0,01       
       (0.01)       
(10)  Government debt/GDP  
in previous year     0.00     
       (0.00)       
(11)  Current account balance/GDP        -0.004     
         (0.01)     
(12)  Current account balance/GDP 
 (European emerging)     -0.003    
       (0.01)    
(13)  Bank-related capital 
inflow/GDP         0.000  0.000 
        (0.00)  (0.00) 
(14)  Bank-related capital inflow/ 
/GDP (European emerging)        0.014 0.01 
         (0.01)*   (0.00)* 
(15)  Bank credit growth         0,001 
        (0.00) 
(16)  Bank credit growth (European 
emerging)       0.005 
        (0.004) 
(17)  Episode  "pre-Lehman"  0.13 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.12 
       (0.03)**     (0.04)**    (0.04)**    (0.04)**    (0.03)**   (0.04)** 
(18)  Episode  "post-Lehman"  0.37 0.37 0.23 0.36 0.35 0.36 
      (0.07)**     (0.07)**    (0.06)**    (0.07)**    (0.07)**    (0.07)** 
(19)  European emerging dummy         0.17  0.11  -0.06 
             (0.07)*    (0.06)+  (0.13) 
(20)  Constant  -0.06  -0.17  -0.19  -0.15  -0.17       -0.20 
    (0.08)    (0.05)   (0.08)    (0.05)     (0.05)**    (0.07)** 
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 Test     
H0: (12) +
+ (19) = 0
H0: (14) +
+ (19) = 0
H0: (13) +  
+ (14) = 0 
  P-value of test      0.02  0.00  0.02 
  R-squared  0.46 0.37 0.57 0.44 0.48 0.58 
 Observations  97 97 94 97 97 88 
Notes: 
a Standard errors in parentheses; **, *, + indicate signficance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.  
b Each convergence criteria (see footnote 4) is assigned one point. If the country fulfills a criterion,i 
it gets 0, otherwise 1. Therefore, a country that fulfills all criteria get 0, if none of the criteria, gets 5. 
The variable used in the regression takes values from 0 to 5. 
Sources:  Bloomberg L.P.; IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; European 
Central Bank; European Commission; and IMF staff estimates. 
 
 – High current account deficit. Even when controlling for the fulfillment of the con-
vergence criteria, the spreads increased with current account deficits. This effect 
is significantly stronger in the  NMS and other emerging European economies 
than in advanced economies in Europe. This puts renewed emphasis on the im-
portance of known vulnerabilities. 
 – Bank-related capital inflows. Reflecting some of the stylized facts discussed above, 
countries with larger bank-related capital inflows in percent of GDP were hit 
harder. In this respect, the impact on NMS did not substantially differ from that of 
other emerging European economies, possibly due to the similarity of structure  
of ownership of the banking systems in almost all countries in emerging Europe. 
One interpretation would be that financial markets reacted adversely to bank sub-
sidiaries’ borrowing overseas from parent banks in an environment where the par-
ent banks were experiencing increasing liquidity tightness themselves. A “sudden 
stop” in loans from foreign parent banks to subsidiaries, or cross-border loans to 
corporates, would have far-reaching adverse effects on credit and GDP growth, 
apart from pressures that it would put on the exchange rate or reserves. Large- 
-scale foreign currency mismatches in the  private sector in most of emerging 
Europe – except for the Czech Republic, Russia, and Turkey, for which foreign 
currency loans in all countries exceeded 30% of total loans (IMF, 2009b) – make 
credit quality very sensitive to sudden exchange rate movements. 
 – Credit growth. By itself, credit growth was a source of concern for financial mar-
kets, but not independently of that of the capital inflow from parent banks. In-
deed, such inflows appear to dominate the effect of credit growth on bond spreads. 
In other words, the funding of credit growth and the adverse implications that 
a drop in such funding would have on GDP growth – given the dependence of 
economic activity on rapid credit growth so far – seems to be a source of concern 
for foreign investors in emerging Europe.  
The fact that crisis resilience varied so widely across emerging markets has its 
deeper roots in differing policies and vulnerabilities. For instance, among NMS econ-
omies, Hungary with its large fiscal deficit, high inflation, and external debt was 
an early victim of the crisis; the Slovak Republic, which adopted the euro in January 
2009 after satisfying all the convergence criteria, has mostly been riding a wave of 
investor optimism on its spreads and stock prices; the Czech Republic, with small 
fiscal and current account deficits, moderate bank-related capital inflows, and lower 
foreign currency bank lending, has fared better than its neighbors so far. Across these 552                                     Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 6 
countries worries about contingent government liabilities from the financial turmoil 
(e.g., in the event parent bank financing dries up and nonperforming loans escalate in 
the banking system) have been at least as important as the actual policy performance 
on the fiscal deficit and government debt. 
Another factor affecting country performance was the  quality of domestic 
policies in the face of the massive private sector capital inflows prior to the crisis. 
Loans from parent banks to eastern European subsidiaries and direct cross-border 
loans from foreign banks to corporates created large debt-rollover needs in the pri-
vate sector (IMF, 2009b). These flows have largely financed activities in the nontrad-
able sectors and contributed to overheating of the economies: the larger the capital 
inflows, the stronger the demand boom, the greater the overheating of the domestic 
economy, and the larger the widening of the current account deficit. While this surge 
in private capital flows was an overwhelming force for all, some emerging European 
economies were more able than others to limit this overheating pressure; this ex-
plains why inflation and current account deficits are good predictors of the current 
problems.  
There are also some indications that countries operating under flexible ex-
change rate arrangements have seen on average a smaller fallout from the crisis in 
terms of bond spreads. The flexibility of the exchange rate provided a welcome pol-
icy tool to control inflation in the run-up to the crisis, while most hard-peg countries 
have ultimately been unable to prevent overheating despite generally prudent fiscal 
policies – Bulgaria, for instance, managed to create a substantial fiscal reserve ac-
count. This experience reinforces the policy lesson that, especially (but not only) under 
fixed exchange rates, strong financial regulation and, in particular, macroprudential 
policies are needed to deal with surging capital inflows and the  risk they entail. 
Examples of such policies are regulations that make banks hold more capital for short 
term cross-border funds, including those from parent banks, and for risky loans, 
including those in foreign currency, that banks extend using such funds.  
5. Conclusions 
The crisis has clearly put an increased premium on sound macroeconomic and 
macroprudential policies in individual emerging market countries, as financial mar-
ket participants are paying less attention to group effects.  
The analysis in this article underscores this point by showing the  disap-
pearance of the EU halo effect. We find that, during the crisis, the sovereign bond 
spreads in EU’s New Member States have gone to what can be explained by funda-
mentals.  
We have also illustrated the increased country dispersion of sovereign spreads 
during the crisis, and demonstrated that it can be, to a large part, explained by dif-
ferences in the macroeconomic performance and external vulnerabilities of the coun-
tries, in particular by their success (or lack thereof) in keeping inflation low and the fi-
nancing of the current account deficit at a sustainable level in the run-up to the crisis.  
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